

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

September 25, 1972

## MEMORANDUM FOR

The Under Secretary of State  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Central Intelligence  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: MBFR

To continue our preparations looking forward to initial MBFR discussions in late January, the following work should be undertaken by the Verification Panel Working Group:

1. Work on the sanitized version of the MBFR Evaluation Report developed by the Working Group should be completed promptly and provided to our NATO Allies and General Goodpaster by September 27, together with a request for their comments as an input to our own decisions. In resolving differences, agencies should bear in mind the need to provide the Allies with the fullest possible descriptions of the problems and issues involved in MBFR.

2. Verification. Revision and expansion should be made of the CIA assessment of the U. S. verification capabilities for MBFR. This further work should include:

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matches pp 1-3NSS, OSD  
Reviews  
Completed

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31, 1980.

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The first revised draft should be prepared by CIA and distributed by October 11, 1972.

3. Data Uncertainty. A paper should be prepared on the effects of data uncertainty on each of the three classes of options that have been considered symmetrical reductions common ceiling and mixed packages. ACDA should prepare a first draft by October 12.

4. Air Force Reductions. OSD should examine alternative methods for structuring and rationalizing reductions in air forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces for Central Europe. It should include consideration of an area of reductions which is wider than Central Europe and the possibility that air reductions would be negotiated after ground force reductions. A preliminary draft should be distributed by October 9, 1972.

In addition, the work outlined below which is already underway under the direction of the Working Group should be completed on an expeditious basis.

1. Work on the development of alternative approaches to the exploratory talks should continue on the basis of the September 15 draft paper prepared by ACDA. A revised version incorporating interagency comments should be completed by September 27.

2. Warsaw Pact Buildup. CIA should develop an interim progress report on its overall review of Warsaw Pact mobilization and reinforcement capabilities, including the effectiveness of mobilized forces. This should be distributed by October 9, 1972.

3. Alternative Ways to Structure U. S. and Allied Ground Force Reductions. OSD should examine alternative ways of structuring 10 to 20 percent cuts in U. S. and Allied military ground forces in the NATO

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Guidelines Area plus Hungary with a view toward minimizing impact on NATO military capabilities especially initial combat capabilities. OSD should have a first draft prepared by close of business October 12, 1972.

4. Allies War Reserve Stocks. OSD should prepare an assessment of information on Allied war reserve stocks and prepare a country-by-country status report, using the U. S. as a benchmark, of the ammunition and equipment stockage levels in days of supply (for each of the various methods used) or total quantities as appropriate. An evaluation should be made of the degree to which Allied stocks are commensurate with our own and adequate to carry out a conventional engagement for at least 90 days. U. S. ability to resupply our Allies should also be considered. This report is to be distributed by October 16, 1972.

5. Nuclear Issues. We need to seriously address the issue of nuclear weapons and delivery systems (other than aircraft) reductions in MBFR. The following work should be undertaken or completed with drafts circulated by October 9, 1972.

- OSD should complete its work on the tank/tac nuc mixed package options.
- OSD should develop alternative ways of withdrawing 1,000, 2,000, 3,000 weapons from the NATO stockpiles in the Central Region and evaluate the effects on NATO nuclear capabilities in terms of the NATO delivery systems which could no longer be supported.
- ACDA should examine alternative reductions in nuclear delivery systems on both sides.
- CIA should produce a report on Pact tactical nuclear capabilities in the reduction area.

  
Henry A. Kissinger

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ACTION

September 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: PHIL ODEEN/HAL SONNENFELDT *HS/6/72*

SUBJECT: MBFR Directive

The enclosed memo lays on the Verification Panel Working Group a series of studies and other work to be carried out over the next few weeks.

To get the bureaucracy to do the work you requested at the VP/ SRG meeting, it is important for you to issue a directive. After the meeting on August 3, we tried to get many similar studies underway through the Working Group but the bureaucracy -- particularly OSD -- did not respond. In fact, OSD has taken the position that it will only work on the basis of a formal request from you. The attached directive repeats the request for the earlier studies plus other work that is now timely.

The memo also makes it clear we are going to send NATO a sanitized version of the Evaluation Report with the three classes of options (not Laird's one-track approach).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab A.